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This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group. The book analyses why there was no stockpile of chemical or biological weapons to be found in Iraq. Finally, it examines the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes.
This book examines the politics of biological disarmament, focusing on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a treaty regime and the cornerstone of biological disarmament efforts. Biological weapons have long been banned, but the ban needs strengthening. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the cornerstone of this disarmament regime. After years of deadlock and disappointment its Sixth Review Conference in 2006 generated new hope that biological disarmament could be reinforced from within. This book studies the intricate diplomacy of the Sixth Review Conference as a key moment in the recovery of self-confidence by the treaty parties. It makes detailed proposals for developing...
Recent advances in disciplines such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and neuropharmacology entail a "dual-use dilemma" because they promise benefits for human health and welfare yet pose the risk of misuse for hostile purposes. The emerging field of synthetic genomics, for example, can produce custom DNA molecules for life-saving drugs but also makes possible the creation of deadly viral agents for biological warfare or terrorism. The challenge for policymakers is to prevent the misuse of these new technologies without forgoing their benefits . Innovation, Dual Use, and Security offers a systematic approach for managing the dual-use dilemma. The book presents a "decision framework" for asse...
The threat of biological weapons has been worrying about the armed forces, as well as political leaders for quite some time. With the global recorded deaths from COVID-19 surpassing one million, the biotechnological revolution has heightened the fear of future weaponized pathogens. The COVID-19 virus or its variant could be the most effective weapon for future biological warfare. The indiscriminate effect of such a weapon and its power to cripple economies and devastate the lives of people may make it attractive to rogue States and non-State actors. This book provides an updated analysis of biological warfare agents, including the COVID-19 virus, biotechnological developments affecting biological agents, and the legal regime responsible for preventing the use of biological weapons.
'Unrivalled collection of concrete examples from across the globe of research where potential for weaponisation and opportunities for repression are high, but intent is unclear or could easily be misperceived. A substantial contribution to the current international debate on how we can raise political and legal barriers to prevent States misusing life science advances.' -Filippa Lentzos, Senior Lecturer in Science and International Security, King's College London, UK 'Asks the key question of how states and scientists should respond to the current advances in life science research and development to prevent their weaponisation. A must-read for all concerned.' -Nariyoshi Shinomiya, President ...
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This book illustrates how illicit trafficking affects both the stability of states & the safety of their populations. Curbing its development & proliferation calls for a better assessment of the phenomenon & a new way of looking at problems & identifying solutions. The debate in this book centres around such prominent issues as trafficking in small arms; delivery system technologies & components; & weapons of mass destruction. The book concludes with a set of recommendations on how to develop cooperation & provides an action-oriented agenda that can be adopted by such institutions as police forces, border patrols, judiciary & parliamentary institutions, INTERPOL & intelligence services.
This book discusses recent brain research and the potentially dangerous dual-use applications of the findings of these research projects. The book is divided into three sections: Part I examines the rise in dual-use concerns within various state’s chemical and biological non-proliferation regime’s during this century, as well as the rapid technologically driven advances in neuroscience and the associated possible misuse considerations in the same period. Part II reviews the brain research projects in the EU, USA, Japan, China and several other countries with regard to their objectives, achievements and measures to deal with the problem of dual-use. Part III assesses the extent to which the results of this civil neuroscience work, which is intended to be benign, are being, and could be protected against future hostile applications in the development of novel chemical and biological weapons.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention entirely prohibits biological warfare, but it has no effective verification mechanism to ensure that the 140-plus States Parties are living up to their obligations. From 1995-2001 the States Parties attempted to negotiate a Protocol to the Convention to remedy this deficiency. On 25 July 2001 the United States entirely rejected the final text which would probably have been acceptable to most other states. The book investigates how this disaster came about, and the potential consequences of the failure of American leadership.