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Our experience of a unified sense of the self is underwritten by a multiplicity of self-aspects having very different metaphysical commitments. Our experience of unity is provided by a process-which, under certain clinical conditions, is rendered inoperative-that enables a person to experience mental states as personally owned.
If there is one topic on which we all are experts, it is ourselves. Psychologists depend upon this expertise, as asking people questions about themselves is an important means by which they gather the data that provide much of the evidence for psychological theory. Personal recollections play an important role in clinical theorizing; people's thoughts, feelings, and beliefs provide the principal data for attitudinal research; and judgments of one's traits and descriptions of one's goals and motivations are essential for the study of personality. Yet despite their long dependence on self-report data, psychologists know very little about this basic resource and the processes that govern it. In...
What matters in personal survival? What makes self-awareness possible? If there is no permanent self, should we be altruistic? These and other questions were tackled by the international participants in the 2018 Uehiro Graduate Student Philosophy Conference at University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa. Their responses explore the subject of subjecthood from interdisciplinary and comparative perspectives. Some approach it from an analytic point of view, others from a historical, and as many as five draw from non-Western traditions to argue their points. We have selected seven of the 21 papers presented at the conference. Given their comparative scope, they provide a slightly unusual sample of the discussions in philosophy of self and personhood today. The collection would be of interest not only to graduate students and professional philosophers, but also to anyone curious about the comparative methods used to investigate the self in philosophy.
Computational geometry is a borderline subject related to pure and applied mathematics, computer science, and engineering. The book contains articles on various topics in computational geometry based on invited lectures and contributed papers presented during the program on computational geometry at the Morningside Center of Mathematics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Beijing). The opening article by R.-H. Wang gives a nice survey of various aspects of computational geometry, many of which are discussed in detail in the volume. Topics of the other articles include problems of optimal triangulation, splines, data interpolation, problems of curve and surface design, problems of shape control, quantum teleportation, and more. The book is suitable for graduate students and researchers interested in computational geometry and specialists in theoretical computer science.
Episodic memory refers to the ability to remember personal experiences in terms of what happened and where and when it happened. Humans are also able to remember the specific perceptions, emotions and thoughts they had during a particular experience. This highly sophisticated and unique memory system is extremely sensitive to cerebral aging, neurodegenerative and neuropsychiatric diseases. The field of episodic memory research is a continuously expanding and fascinating area that unites a broad spectrum of scientists who represent a variety of research disciplines including neurobiology, medicine, psychology and philosophy. Nevertheless, important questions still remain to be addressed. This research topic on the Progress in Episodic Memory Research covers past and current directions in research dedicated to the neurobiology, neuropathology, development, measurement and treatment of episodic memory.
Human beings experience a world of objects: bounded entities that occupy space and persist through time. Our actions are directed toward objects, and our language describes objects. We categorize objects into kinds that have different typical properties and behaviors. We regard some kinds of objects – each other, for example – as animate agents capable of independent experience and action, while we regard other kinds of objects as inert. We re-identify objects, immediately and without conscious deliberation, after days or even years of non-observation, and often following changes in the features, locations, or contexts of the objects being re-identified. Comparative, developmental and ad...