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This book presents the theory of the validity of legal norms, aimed at the practice of law, in particular the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts. The postpositivist concept of the validity of statutory law, grounded on a critical analysis of the basic theories of legal validity elaborated up to now, is introduced. In the first part of the book a contemporary German nonpositivist conception of law developed by Ralf Dreier and Robert Alexy is analysed in order to answer the question whether the juristic concept of legal validity should include moral standards or criteria. In the second part, a postpositivist concept of legal validity and an innovative model of validity discourse, based on the juristic presumption of the validity of legal norms, are proposed. The book is a work on analytical legal theory, written from a postpositivist, detached point of view.
The book describes the main concepts of the correctness thesis. The second part presents a reconstruction of the claim to correctness in some classical legal theories. For instance, it explains the thesis that we can find two different references to claims in Kelsen ́s theory, therefore allusions to a kind of classifying and qualifying connections. About Fuller one can find the idea that he introduces not only a procedural moral claim but also a substantive one. With respect to Radbruch, the book holds the idea that the correctness thesis can be found in his theory since 1932. The third part considers some main objections against the claim to correctness especially that proposed by Joseph Raz and John Finnis among others.
Legal statements are, according to the authors, the most basic elements of the law. Nevertheless they must be considered not only as the pieces of a puzzle, but also as the components of a dynamic and highly complex reality: the law of contemporary society. The book presents an analysis of the different types of legal statements (mandatory rules, principles, power-conferring rules, definitions, permissions, values and the rule of recognition) from a threeefold perspective, that is, considering their logical structure, their function in legal reasoning as reasons for action, and their connections with the interests and power relationships among the individuals and the social groups. The result is conceived as a first step in the building of a general theory of law designed not as an isolated discourse but as a decisive element for the dynamization of the legal culture.
No detailed description available for "Actions, Norms, Values".
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law is a forum for some of the best new philosophical work on law, by both senior and junior scholars from around the world. The essays range widely over issues in general jurisprudence (the nature of law, adjudication, and legal reasoning), the philosophical foundations of specific areas of law (from criminal law to evidence to international law), the history of legal philosophy, and related philosophical topics that illuminate the problems of legal theory. OSPL will be essential reading for philosophers, academic lawyers, political scientists, and historians of law who wish to keep up with the latest developments in this flourishing field.
Bulygin is a distinguished representative of legal science and legal philosophy as they are known on the European continent which springs from the role of the civil law tradition in his home country, Argentina. At the same time, he has engaged over the past half-century virtually all of the major figures in legal philosophy in the English-speaking countries. The views expressed are often unorthodox, and challenge received opinion on gaps in the law, on the character of legal efficacy, on the oft-claimed dependent character of permissory norms, and on the criteria of legal validity.
There is something quite puzzling about the global conversation on jurisprudence. On the one hand, jurisprudence is supposed to deal with abstract questions concerning the nature, structure, and distinctive features of the law. These questions are not tightly associated with, or dependent on, the particular legal practices in one jurisdiction or another. But, on the other hand, it seems that jurisprudents are tacitly affected by their background institutional context: there is an evident divide between theorizing about the law in the civil law world and in the common law world. Jurisprudence in the Mirror: The Common Law World Meets the Civil Law World systematically presents the major achie...
This volume explores the importance of constitutivism for legal studies. Constitutivism is the view that the normative force, or authority, of practical reasons is grounded in principles, capacities, aims, or functions that are essential to, and thus constitutive of, agency. While the implications that the constitutivist approach has on the fundamental metaethical disputes and central ethical debates have been extensively explored, the literature on the relations between constitutivism and law remains scarce, unsystematic, and sporadic. This collection brings together world-renowned practical philosophers and legal theorists to fill a noticeable gap in the literature. The authors systematica...
Thirteen papers, consisting of logical analyses in legal and moral philosophy, presented or written for a small conference held in Uppsala, March 14 and 15, 2002. The conference, held in honor of Åqvist's 70th birthday, was sponsored jointly by the Uppsala University Dept. of Philosophy and S.C.A.S.S.S. (the Swedish Collegium of Advanced Study in the Social Sciences).