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Spontaneous Order
Spontaneous Order brings together Peyton Young's research on evolutionary game theory and its diverse applications across a wide range of academic disciplines, including economics, sociology, philosophy, biology, computer science, and engineering. Enhanced with an introductory essay and commentaries, the book pulls together the author's work thematically to provide a valuable resource for scholars of economic theory. Young argues that equilibrium behaviors often coalesce from the interactions and experiences of many dispersed individuals acting with fragmentary knowledge of the world, rather than (as is often assumed in economics) from the actions of fully rational agents with commonly held beliefs. The author presents a unified and rigorous account of how such 'bottom-up' evolutionary processes work, using recent advances in stochastic dynamical systems theory. This analytical framework illuminates how social norms and institutions evolve, how social and technical innovations spread in society, and how these processes depend on adaptive learning behavior by human subjects.
Equity
Governments and institutions, perhaps even more than markets, determine who gets what in our society. They make the crucial choices about who pays the taxes, who gets into college, who gets medical care, who gets drafted, where the hazardous waste dump is sited, and how much we pay for public services. Debate about these issues inevitably centers on the question of whether the solution is "fair." In this book, H. Peyton Young offers a systematic explanation of what we mean by fairness in distributing public resources and burdens, and applies the theory to actual cases.
Strategic Learning and Its Limits
Table of contents
Individual Strategy and Social Structure
Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
Strategic Learning and Its Limits
In this book an economist suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in current economics. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; and much more
Game Theory, Experience, Rationality
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right t...
Strategic Learning and Its Limits
In this book an economist suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in current economics. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; and much more
Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions
This book addresses the lively interaction between the disciplines of law and economics. The contributions encompass some of the core controversial issues in the disciplines arising from interactions between legal orderings and economic institutions.
Political Contingency
Political science & theory.
Handbook of Financial Stress Testing
Discover current uses and future development of stress tests, the most innovative regulatory tool to prevent and fight financial crises.
