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Key judgements 1. The Biden administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has so far lacked focus and urgency. Despite its deep regional expertise and the region’s high expectations, it has failed to articulate a comprehensive regional strategy or treat the Indo-Pacific as its decisive priority. 2. The Biden administration’s focus on bringing normalcy back to US regional policy has restored the status quo, but not advanced its standing in the Indo-Pacific. 3. The Biden administration’s approach to competition with China has focused on the domestic and global arenas, rather than on competing for influence within the Indo-Pacific. 4. The Biden administration’s focus on long-term syst...
President Donald Trump has hinted at a more muscular US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. In tweets and speeches since the election, he has adopted a hard-line on China’s island-building in the South China Sea, vowed to prevent North Korea from acquiring a functional nuclear missile, condemned Beijing over its unfair trade practices, and raised the prospect of deeper US-Taiwan relations. His Asia team is shaping up to reflect Trump’s hawkish stance towards China on trade and security. But it is also likely to be an eclectic group whose perspectives on other Asia policy issues differ both internally and with figures on the national security cabinet. Australia will have to prepare for a more turbulent US-China relationship, as well as greater uncertainty in Washington’s Asia policy.
The 30th round of the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) will soon take place amid immense global disruption and unprecedented domestic pressures accelerated by the spread of SARS-CoV-2 (also known as coronavirus or COVID-19). Our Indo-Pacific neighbourhood should be at the top of the agenda. It is hard to imagine a more urgent time for the Australia-United States alliance to provide strong and collaborative regional leadership — and to bolster the resilience of the Indo-Pacific across all of its dimensions: from health security and economic development to the balance of military power and strategic resilience. It is equally hard to imagine a more difficult environm...
The Trump administration looks to be adopting a more muscular and self-interested security policy in the Asia-Pacific. Confrontational on China: Trump and his advisers have outlined a hard line towards China on most bilateral issues, and view Beijing as an aggressive strategic competitor that needs to be deterred with US strength. Supportive but transactional on allies: the administration will uphold Asian security guarantees at the same time as more strictly scrutinising the US interests at stake. The United States will seek greater burden-sharing and “wins” from allies, including initiatives to create new US jobs. A military-first rebalance: the administration will advance the security...
Deterring the use of armed force and other forms of coercion is central to the maintenance of order in the Indo-Pacific. Yet from the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, to space, cyberspace, and the rules-based order itself, deterrence is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of major power competition, new grey zone challenges, emerging military technologies, and a rapidly shifting regional balance of power. The United States and Australia are determined to offset these trends by pursuing more integrated strategies for the Indo-Pacific. In recent months, the Trump administration has emphasised long-term strategic competition with China, placing renewed focus on technolo...
The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2021 provides insight into key regional strategic, geopolitical, economic, military and security topics. Among the topics explored are: US−China decoupling and its regional security implications; Japan’s security policy and China; India’s emerging grand strategy; Southeast Asia amid rising great-power rivalry; Australia’s new regional security posture; NATO’s evolving approach to China; The United Kingdom’s ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific; and Emerging technologies and future conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Authors include leading regional analysts and academics Kanti Bajpai, Gordon Flake, Franz-Stefan Gady, Prashanth Parameswaran, Alessio Patalano, Samir Puri, Sarah Raine, Tan See Seng, Drew Thompson, Ashley Townshend, Joanne Wallis and Robert Ward.
In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China’s assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China’s maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.
America no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific and its capacity to uphold a favourable balance of power is increasingly uncertain. The combined effect of ongoing wars in the Middle East, budget austerity, underinvestment in advanced military capabilities and the scale of America’s liberal order-building agenda has left the US armed forces ill-prepared for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. America’s 2018 National Defense Strategy aims to address this crisis of strategic insolvency by tasking the Joint Force to prepare for one great power war, rather than multiple smaller conflicts, and urging the military to prioritise requirements for deterrence vis-à-vis China...
The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment examines key regional security issues relevant to the policy-focused discussions of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier defence summit convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It is published each year in association with the Dialogue and the issues analysed within its covers are central to discussions at the event. Among the topics explored are: US Indo-Pacific strategy, alliances and security partnerships; Chinese perspectives on regional security; Taiwan’s security and the possibility of conflict; the continuing challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes; the nuclear dynamics of Sino-A...
There is a small risk of deliberate nuclear use and a larger risk of inadvertent nuclear use in a future US-China conflict, both of which could increase if the possibility of conflict grows or if Washington or Beijing pursue more ambitious nuclear strategies. China’s nuclear strategy has to date focused on deterring an adversary’s nuclear threats and use. While its recent nuclear arsenal modernisation is consistent with this strategy, Beijing has acquired new capabilities that could enable a shift to a nuclear first-use strategy. The United States and China are not in a nuclear arms race. Nevertheless, efforts by the United States to maintain its current margin of superiority over China...